By Florina Vevera, PhD

While I am loooking forward to discuss with you: Europe/Russia, but also the Middle East and perhaps Asia/China, I shall pass in review my perspectives upon the crisis in Ukraine and Europe’s future.

Greece’s creditors have reached a consensus on proposal to Athens and the Greek government has lately shown more realism.

Still, the posibility of Grexit raises the question „At what cost do we contiue the EU?”

The cost of keeping the EU, even the euro, far outweighs that of ditching them. It is interesting to remember that the EU institutions and the EU itself are the direct successors of the Marshall Plan – officially the European Recovery Program (ERP). The ERP aimed at rebuilding war-devastated regions, removing trade barriers, modernizing industry, and make Europe prosperous again. It required bringing down the barriers between European states, getting rid of the incredible amount of red tape constraining business, encouraging an increase in productivity, labor union membership, as well as the adoption of modern business procedures. The union of Europe was beneficial to the US in at least two different ways: by allowing European not to starve, it made them less prey to Communist and Soviet enterprises, and by creating a single, large market, it made things much easier for American industry. One should not be surprised that the US is sometimes more European than the European themselves: see for instance US warnings to the UK not to leave the EU.

Uniting a continent made up of old nations, speaking different languages, that have been at war with each other for centuries, was no mean feat. The current difficulties are dwarfed by the achievements, though people quickly forget what these are.

George C. Marshall had the foresight to understand that an Europe that would remain divided in small countries would recover only slowly (the roles of William L. Clayton and George F. Kennan should also be mentioned, as well as those of European politicians with „Atlanticist” views, Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman). Paul Hoffman, head of the Economic Cooperation Administration, told Congress in 1949 that Marshall aid had provided the „critical margin” on which other investment needed for European recovery depended. The Marshall Plan was one of the first elements of European integration, as it erased trade barriers and set up institutions to coordinate economic policies on a continental level: it stimulated the total political reconstruction of Western Europe. Who remembers that the OECD, previously OEEC, with responsibilities that later extended to the whole of the industrialized world, was an international agency created to administer the Marshall Plan?

There was also the objective of not resuming the cycle of continental and world war that plagued Europe for so long. The cornerstone of early Europe, the European communities (the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom), and the European Economic Community (EEC)), was the agreement between France and Germany that a solid foundation for peace was to be established, and that the strongest foundation would be economic integration. France needed a large market for its agriculture (as well as subsidies as it was not very productive), Germany for its industrial goods.

Though European unification started before them, the main impetus for a political Europe came from Charles De Gaulle and Konrad Adenauer. Since those times, although Germany and France often disagreed on economic matters, politically both countries kept closely aligned, to the point where critics said that Europe was jointly governed by those two countries at the expense of others. The only serious, short-lived political difference came when the Berlin Wall fell, and both François Mitterrand and Margaret Thatcher wanted to slow down the reunification of Germany, prisoner as their minds were of pre-WW II history. After a short hesitation, George HW Bush, advised by Brent Scowcroft and Condoleeza Rice, came down on Helmut Kolh’s side.

The benefits of European integration can be best seen in smaller economies like Portugal and Ireland, or even larger one like Spain, whatever their current difficulties which will be overcome. Before entering the EU, Spain and Portugal had barely entered the 20th century. Since we can’t rewrite history, it is difficult to evaluate how they would have fared without European integration, but it can be shown that they enormously benefited from it. This is not realized by everyone, in particular those who mainly see the US-originated 2008 financial crisis and the 2009 euro crisis that isn’t fully finished yet.

Norway and Switzerland did quite well, without the EU, but this was due to a particular set of circumstances which would be too long to describe here. Let’s simply say that offshore oil in Norway and the role of Switzerland as an international financial and banking center, played a major role.

The Euro, the main proponent of which was France (Germany was quite keen on continuing with the Deutschmark initially), was seen as the missing component of European economic integration. It eliminated the exchange risk as well as a lot of red tape, and presided over a steep increase in intra-Eurozone trade. The problem however was that while a central monetary agency was put in charge of managing the Euro, fiscal policies remained a national prerogative. The contradiction was solved with the so-called Maastricht convergence criteria, which set maximum limits on budget deficit-to-GDP and debt-to-GDP ratios, so that no Eurozone member state can try to live at the expense of the other members. Alas, the necessary discipline was enforced in a lax way, with Germany and France being the first to cheat (but in a small proportion relative to their wealth), but smaller countries doing the same with a vengeance, so that they built an enormous structural (ie unrelated to the business cycle) budget deficit and a debt exceeding their GDP (the case of Spain is different and is much more linked to untimely -ie just before the 2008 financial crisis- huge investment in tourist-oriented real estate investment).

The problem with voters and governments whose main concern is the next election- is that they only take the short view. This is understandable of ordinary citizens when they are unemployed, see their standard of living dwindle, etc, but less so of governments. But these same governments are elected by those same ordinary citizens, hence the conundrum. Only statesmen with superior leadership qualities can steer their citizens toward accepting temporary sacrifices for medium term benefits. In the EU there is currently in my view only one acceptable leader, Angela Merkel. But she is no Churchill. Only a Churchill could tell his fellow citizens: „Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning.” Perhaps this is now the beginning of the end of the Eurozone crisis, but not yet the end. As for the crisis with Russia, this is just the end of the beginning.

Putin may indeed give Athens a helping hand  – money and preferential natural gas prices – just to ward off further EU sanctions that will need EU unanimity. But Russian help can only offer temporary relief and won’t help restructure the Greek economy (it could actually help delay needed reforms) and ensure her place in the Eurozone. Greek plans as received in Brussels are for most of them not serious. If Greece does not submit more serious proposals, she will be running short of cash and Grexit will become a possibility. I won’t make predictions: the Tsipras government has show that it could change its tune when short of options.

Grexit concerns the Eurozone, not the EU. One can stay in the EU without keeping the Euro as currency. There has been no threat that Greece could reconsider her position in NATO. The reason has a name and that name is Turkey, with Cyprus as an appendix to that reason.

If one wants to keep the Euro alive – and there is unanimity of particpating governments on that – in the absence of federalism which very few want, it can’t be done without reurning to the targets specified in the Maastricht Convergence Criteria, though some countries can be given some more time.

I am not aware that the founding principles of the EU, while they include solidarity, also include provisions that one member state could live of other member states’ money for an unlimited period of time. The creation of the Euro included in the Maastricht Treaty, which has been strengthened by the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (aka Fiscal Compact), recognizes and tries to solve the contradiction between a central monetary agency and national fiscal policies by imposing convergence criteria regarding the ratios between budget deficit and GDP and debt and GDP, which Greece has consistently ignored until she had to be bailed out. Greece is benefiting from a great deal of bailout money from the EU bailout fund and the IMF, but this is not without conditions. Though there’s been some progress, Greece still rejects some of those conditions without offering a serious alternative.

I would say that the Commission is also bowing to the inevitable.

Europe remains a collection of nation-states, each with its own history and a federal Europe is not to happen in the near future. To become federal, where will this ever happen, Europe will have to overcome at least 400 years of history, and the addition of new members can complicate matters.

The Riga Eastern Partnership was a bit of a let down. While not all countries that have signed on to the partnership will become members of the EU – that’s quite obvious for Azerbaijan and Armenia for instance, while Belarus is a special case in view of its political regime, Ukraine and Georgia are aiming at EU membership when they will be ready – this will require a lot of reforms – and nothing has been said before to discourage them. Moldova is a but further down the line but should also be able to join.

Russia has no say and should have no say in who joins the EU – neither has the United States. It is purely a matter for the elected government of those countries and of course for the EU. In the 1997 Founding Act of her partership with NATO Russia committed to eschew a policy of spheres of influence, but her behavior says the opposite. Worse, with Georgia and Ukraine, Russia showed she was prepared to use force to impose what she has designated as her sphere (the language is respect for her „legitimate interests”). This should be resisted at any cost. The US cannot decide who will join the EU, but can support with NATO those who have made the choice of seeking EU membership.

Reading Russia’s „black list”, I found the fact that The Kremlin expressed anger it was „leaked” by a European embassy quite funny.

The list was normal tit-for-tat. Most on the list have no special interest in flying to Moscow. It’s pure retaliation. I observed however that there is a significant difference between the US/EU lists (which aren’t exactly the same) and the Russian one: the Western list contains only names of people who have directly or indirectly participated in the violation of international law in Ukraine at the behest of Russia. Those on the Russian list did no such thing.

While the list contains no prime ministers or members of governments, it includes party leaders (eg Nick Clegg of the UK), current (eg Arnold Sinisalu, director general of Estonia’s domestic security service) and former officials such as former SIS chief and former UK Ambassador to the UN Sir John Sawers.

Andrew Parker, the current director-general of the British Security Service, is on the Russian ban list. MI5, as it is still often called, deals only with domestic matters. The head of the Secret Intelligence Service, aka MI6, Alex Younger, is not on the list. The head of MI6 might want to meet with his Russian opposite number in Moscow, Mikhail Y. Fradkov, the head of the SVR RF, for instance to discuss terrorism or mutual nonaggression moves. That of MI5 is less likely to meet in Russia with the head of the FSB, Aleksandr Bortnikov, althought, for instance, it was Alexander Bortnikov who led the Russian delegation to the White House’s summit on Countering Violent Extremism.

The Russians certainly guessed the list would leak out but they avoided the shock of a list being leaked all at once rather than bit by bit as it happened initially. The other aspect is that there are no indications why one is on the list, though in certain cases it is quite obvious. This reminds me of Richard Nixon’s black list: people are proud to be on the list or sorry they aren’t.

Aside the issue of the list I have noted that in the past three weeks Moscow has toned down its rhetoric, even finding convergences where there is little of that. They claim there is common ground on Syria, the FSB’s Alexander Bortnikov praised US intelligence and cooperation with it while in Washington, Putin and Lavrov claim that just like the West they are trying to have Minsk agreements and the ceasefire observed, etc. Though there is no real, substantive change in Russian policy, it seems that Putin has decided not to make matters worse with incendiary statements.

That Russia’s relation with the external world and in particular with the West is based on an out of the ordinary view of the world which is neither new nor limited to V. V. Putin is no novelty. The conflict is certainly political but Russia has chosen to use force to further her objectives. No one wants to go to war against Russia, but her violations of international law, her land grabbing and threats against further countries cannot be tolerated. Russia must be made to return to compliance with the UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, OSCE rules and documents, and the 1997 Founding Act of the NATO-Russia partnership under which the signatories renounced spheres of influence, recognized the right of every European country to chose the means of ensuring its own security including eventually joining NATO (in exchange of what NATO committed not to station additional combat troops in the new NATO countries). With EU help Ukraine can very much reduce her dependence on Russia, but if Russia returns to international law and within her recognized borders there will be no reason for Ukraine not to have mutually beneficial economic relations with Russia. The Russian Federation must not be contained but rolled back to where she was before the 2008 invasion of Georgia.

Russia fears encirclement by NATO, but it is her actions that are drawing a growing number of European countries towards NATO membership – even neutral Finland and Sweden are thinking about it – so as to be protected by the Washington Treaty’s article 5. It is Russian’s encroachments that has triggered the hostility of Eastern Europe towards Moscow.

Perhaps Russia might study the „security dilemma” and realize her unilateral pursuit of security will only make her less secure. Putin’s policies yield the opposite of what they intended to achieve.

Speculations is often useless but entertaining. I guess Putin is holding his horses for several reasons: sanctions renewal is coming up, Ukraine is on the brink of collapse anyway, doing nothing may cost him little and achieve his aims and Putin too is now concerned that events in Syria are on the wrong track as Assad looks weaker.

As to the explanations, one may speculate, but I would rank first, together with the parlous state of the Russian economy, pressure from several prominent members of the Russian elite, Putin’s power base, not to push things too far as they realize Russia and they themselves will pay the price of isolation. They don’t go as far as saying that Crimea should be returned, though.

The sanctions do work (despite what some seem to believe) and must be extended. The absence of thunder is also important (sorry for the simplistic metafor). Those who say the sanctions don’t work want to get rid of them so that they can freely trade with Russia and perhaps invest there. It’s not going to be easy to extend the sanctions but it remains feasible.

Unfortunately some in Europe have almost written off Crimea because recovering it is „too difficult”. Crimea is not the moon, but I am tempted to quote JFK September, 1962’s speech: „We choose to go to the moon. We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard, because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one that we are willing to accept, one we are unwilling to postpone, and one which we intend to win, and the others, too. ”

This said full respect of the Minsk Protocols by Russia and the separatists, if it really happens, will deserve some encouragement.

On the other hand, Russia should also be warned that any attempt to annex Transnistria, South Ossetia and/or Abkhazia would result in another round of sanctions.

The Treaty on Alliance and Integration signed by Russia and South Ossetia back in March is presented as creating „a joint defense and security zone”, the „integrating” Russia’s and South Ossetia’s customs agencies and the opening of border crossings.

Federica Mogherini says: „Like previous agreements signed between the Russian Federation and the two Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, this “treaty” – which includes references to a transfer of powers in some areas – clearly violates Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, principles of international law and the international commitments taken by the Russian Federation, including the 12 August 2008 Agreement and its Implementing Measures of 8 September 2008 and has no legal standing.”

A similar treaty has been signed between Russia and Abkhazia.

These treaties are obviously a step toward annexation but are not annexation proper, which would entail that the two provinces separated from Georgia join the Russian Federation as a republic or an autonomous region. Quite clearly this is what will happen if this is not strongly resisted, with the threat of additional sanctions.

The Black Sea Rotational Force predates the Russia aggression against Ukraine but not that against Georgia. It began in 2010 with the purpose to form a Security Cooperation Marine Air-Ground Task Force. The forward postured troops’ ability to conduct military-to-military engagements with partner nations in Eastern Europe while providing the capacity for rapid crisis response made it an essential year-round mission to U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and their partners in the Eastern European Theater. The biannual rotation of Marines and sailors with BSRF are postured in Mihail Kogălniceanu Airbase, Romania, which enables the continuation of promoting regional stability, increasing interoperability, and building and maintaining enduring partnerships with allied and partner nations.

The US is not a party to the Minsk Protocol, neither are France, Germany and Russia. It’s been signed by the Ukrainian government and the separatists. But the United Nations Security Council on February 17, 2015, unanimously adopted resolution 2202(2015) endorsing the 13-point accord on ending the Ukraine crisis agreed in Minsk – including a cease-fire – and called on all parties to the conflict to fully implement that cessation of hostilities. This commits Russia.

In the end, I’ll just observe that NATO is in no hurry to denounce the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act because it is the only accord signed by the Russian Federation where Russia recognizes the right of all European countries to join the security organization of their choice. In exchange NATO does not station additional combat forces in the NATO countries bordering Russia in any permanent way. Fast rotation do almost the same job, or will as soon as the system is in full gear. Countries like France which openly oppose Ukraine eventually joining NATO would no longer be restrained in their opposition to the move if we ourselves scuttled this Russian commitment. Of course Russia could withdraw from the Founding Act, but then it would be her responsibility.

All warfare is hybrid, but to paraphrase George Orwell, I’ll say that some wars are more hybrid than others. Ukraine is one of them.

It seems that almost 25 years after Yugoslavia Europe remains unable to look after her own problems when the going gets tough.

Close cooperation between NATO and the EU is an important element in the development of an international “Comprehensive Approach” to crisis management and operations, which requires the effective application of both military and civilian means.

EU exists and it is to remain. It will need to solve its problems, but a European expansion driven only by politics, is not a good thing.