A new theater in the global economic war has opened in the Balkans, the mountainous region in southeastern Europe stretching from the Adriatic to the Black Sea. Though the region is highly dependent on Russian energy, and thus vulnerable to Russian political influence, it relies on the European Union for the rest of its political and economic well-being. Most Balkan states are already EU and NATO members, and those that aren’t are trying to be. They were chronically economically fragile even before the war in Ukraine, which has only compounded the ethnic and political tensions endemic to the region, but the energy crisis the war created has made these countries even more worried about their future – a concern that has compelled them to reconsider their political and economic alignments, even if their futures will be shaped by forces largely outside their control.

Changing Course

At the heart of the matter is the energy sector. Since most Balkan states (save Romania and Greece) depend on Russia for most of their energy, the way they choose to shape their relationships with Moscow is telling about their strategies within the context of the global economic war.

In Bulgaria, Energy Minister Rosen Hristov said the government would inevitably renew negotiations with Russia over gas supplies, which Moscow unilaterally stopped at the end of April when Bulgaria refused to pay Russia in rubles. Paying in rubles at that time would have violated Western sanctions, so Sofia opted to work with Romania on an interconnector that shipped Romanian gas to Bulgaria and with Greece on an interconnector that shipped U.S. liquified natural gas, come what may from Russia.

However, the government has calculated that rerouted LNG from Greece is about 50 percent more expensive than gas from Russia. That may or may not be true – the vagaries of an unstable energy market and the existence of sanctions make it difficult to verify – but even if it were, Bulgaria is clearly signaling that it would be willing to violate sanctions to protect its economic interests, especially since Russia has a history of lowering prices for political benefits. Prices aside, Bulgaria’s decision would likely have an impact, however small, on EU political unity, which is essential if Brussels wants to diminish its overall dependency on Russian energy.

Meanwhile, when Russia cut supplies to Bulgaria in April, Serbia and Hungary worried that their own deliveries, which share a pipeline network with Bulgaria, would be affected. To hedge its bets, Belgrade has been working to diversify its gas supply options. On Aug. 22, after a call between Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, it was confirmed that Serbia will receive energy from Azerbaijan on “favorable terms,” per a memorandum of understanding signed in June. For that to happen, an interconnector must be built between Serbia and Bulgaria. The project is already underway but won’t be ready until next year.

In the meantime, Belgrade has also tried to secure LNG from terminals in Greece and Croatia, most of which is coming from the U.S. at similar prices to what Bulgaria and other European countries are buying. In addition, Serbia announced at the end of July that it would form a working group on the energy crisis and joint strategic projects with North Macedonia and Albania, and is looking to expedite the construction of the interconnector with Romania. The buildup of interconnectors takes time, but they are long-term solutions to strategic problems, ones that will bring Belgrade closer to the West generally and the EU specifically.

Non-Starter

The prospect of Serbia becoming more energy-diverse has prompted the government to declare that it will stop importing Russian crude on Nov. 1, effectively joining the Western sanctions regime. Interestingly, the statement came after a comment made at the beginning of the month by Russia’s ambassador to Serbia that Moscow was interested in opening a military base there. Needless to say, it created a lot of anxiety in Serbia, with the president going so far as to say that Serbia doesn’t need “anyone’s military bases.”

With no response coming from Moscow, it appears that tensions between Moscow and Belgrade have only grown. On Aug. 23, Serbia’s deputy prime minister said that while Serbia had decided not to join sanctions in February, it has “clearly decided against the war in Ukraine,” calling on Russia’s foreign minister to respect its position and no longer describe Serbia as supporting the conflict. The statements were widely carried by the Serbian media for good reason: It is the first time that the Serbian government has openly criticized Russia’s position there.

Serbia’s multi-vector foreign policy is a function of its geopolitical imperative to balance between the great powers. Belgrade has thus maintained good relations with Russia and the EU, and has engaged with China while keeping a safe distance from the U.S., which the public still regards as the aggressor in the NATO intervention in the 1990s. However, seeing the diminishing power and the economic problems that Russia, China and, to a lesser extent, the EU are facing, Serbia has had to warm up to the U.S.

The war in Ukraine seems to have validated Serbia’s strategy. This is why Belgrade is currently betting on the West as its relationship with Russia becomes toxic. Belgrade can’t support Russia in asking for the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk – there are too many similarities between that territory’s fate and Kosovo’s. Supporting Russia in Ukraine would be tantamount to supporting Kosovo’s independence, which is a non-starter for Belgrade. At the same time, Serbia’s economy is largely dependent on the EU, which pushes Belgrade to prioritize its relationship with the West.

Perhaps more important – and what best explains Belgrade’s reaction to Russia’s proposal for a military base – is the fact that Serbia understands Russia could choose to use the Balkans to flank the West. The Balkans would create for the Kremlin another important line of attack, forcing the dispersal of defensive forces and creating new opportunities for attack. But it would also be dangerous for European stability in the long run. And this is something Moscow and Washington understand as well as Belgrade does. The U.S. and the EU have been active diplomatically in the region, either by facilitating discussions between the Kosovars and the Serbs to reach an agreement over issues such as government-issued IDs and license plates in northern Kosovo, talking about how they can help support the local economies or monitoring for potential new instability.

However, it is the way the global economic war is pressing the Balkan states and the way the kinetic war is evolving in Ukraine that will define the region’s future. The decision for a major power to open a new flank, or to block the opening of a new flank in the Balkans, dramatically influences regional stability. This is why seemingly passive statements like those made by Russia’s ambassador have to be taken seriously. As Europe enters another and more complex stage of the war, such statements have the power to drive strategic realignments.